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CRIMINAL LAW-Reckless Endangerment and Coercion-
Union Officials May Be Liable to Criminal Prosecution in
Strike of Essential Public Employees. People v. Vizzini, 78 Misc.
2d 1040, 359 N.Y.S.2d 143 (Sup. Ct. 1974).
Defendants, officers of the Uniformed Firefighters Association
(UFA), were charged with reckless endangerment in the second de-
gree, attempted coercion, reckless endangerment of property, and
related crimes.1 The basis of these charges was the five and one-half
hour New York City fireman's strike called by defendants despite
express Taylor Law2 prohibitions against strikes by public employ-
ees.3 Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment on the grounds
that a strike by firemen could not be the basis of a criminal prosecu-
tion,4 arguing that the Taylor Law provided the exclusive remedies
and sanctions for public employee labor disputes. The New York
Supreme Court denied defendants' motion to dismiss,5 and permit-
ted them to plead guilty to one charge of reckless endangerment.'
1. People v. Vizzini, 78 Misc. 2d 1040, 1042, 359 N.Y.S.2d 143, 146-47
(Sup. Ct. 1974).
2. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1973).
3. Defendants Richard Vizzini, John O'Sullivan, and Dominick Gentil-
uomo were officers of the Uniformed Firefighters Association, the union
representing New York City's 10,000 firemen. N.Y. Times, May 29, 1974,
at 20, col. 3. While the Association was involved in negotiating a contract
with New York City, a resolution was adopted by the membership of the
UFA authorizing the Executive Board to conduct a strike ballot. A mailed
secret ballot was then conducted under the auspices of the Honest Ballot
Association. The results indicated that the firemen had actually voted
4,119 to 3,827 not to authorize the strike. Id. Nov. 17, 1973, at 1, col. 8.
Subsequently, the defendant Vizzini arranged with the other officers to
suppress the results of the strike ballot. He announced that the member-
ship had voted to authorize the Executive Board to call a strike and
pledged a strike to more than 3,000 off-duty firemen at a union rally. Id.
Nov. 6, 1974, at 1, col. 6. The next day, Vizzini announced that the fire-
men went on strike, and the first strike in the 108 year history of the New
York City Fire Department began.
4. 78 Misc. 2d at 1042, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 147.
5. Id. at 1049, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 153.
6. The court also required that the defendants make a three-year no-
strike pledge, in which they pledged not to "advocate, threaten, cause,
call, or support a strike." The defendants also agreed not to appeal the
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New York State has utilized various statutory procedures to deal
with the problem of public employee strikes. In 1947, the state legis-
lature passed the Condon-Wadlin Act,7 which carried severe penal-
ties for public employee strikes.' The harsh strictures of Condon-
Wadlin were, however, rarely imposed because of provisions man-
dating the dismissal of striking public employees.' Repealed in
1967, 1 the Act was replaced by the more lenient Taylor Law, " which
provides for penalties against both the individual striker and the
union. "
The Taylor Law also established procedures for resolving public
court's ruling. N.Y. Times, June 19, 1974, at 1, col. 4. They were subse-
quently sentenced to a three-year probationary period with a stern warning
by Justice Roberts that any violation of their no-strike pledge would per-
mit him to impose the appropriate criminal penalties. Id., July 25, 1974,
at 37, col. 1.
7. Law of Mar. 27, 1947, ch. 391 [1947] N.Y. Laws 842 (repealed 1967).
8. Id. Public employee strikes were prohibited under the Condon-
Wadlin Act. If a strike did occur, the striker's employment was terminated.
Should he reenter public employment, his compensation could not exceed
that which he earned at the time of the strike and he was prohibited from
receiving any salary increases for three years. Further, the striker had to
serve for the succeeding five years without tenure, on probation, and at the
pleasure of the appointing authority. Id.
9. In New York City, the Condon-Wadlin "automatic" penalty provi-
sions were used only twice in the twenty years of the Act's existence. Di-
Maggio v. Brown, 19 N.Y.2d 283, 289, 225 N.E.2d 871, 874, 279 N.Y.S.2d
161,165 (1967). Municipalities were generally reluctant to seek strict appli-
cation of the statute. N.Y. Times, Jan. 5, 1966, at 17, col. 5. Indeed, in New
York City, following the transit strike of 1965-66, the pay increase granted
the striking transit workers was prohibited in a successful court suit
brought by a citizen. Weinstein v. New York City Transit Authority, 49
Misc. 2d 170, 267 N.Y.S.2d 111 (Sup. Ct. 1966). The state legislature
thereupon acted with unusual haste and compromise, and one of serveral
* bipartisan bills was passed granting retroactive forgiveness to the strikers.
10. Law of Apr. 21, 1967, ch. 392 [1967] N.Y. Laws 1102.
11. N.Y. CIv. SERV. LAW §§ 200-14 (McKinney 1973).
12. Id. § 210. The striker is subject to probation of one year during
which time he serves without tenure, id. § 210(2)(f), and a loss of two day's
pay for every day on strike,id. § 210(2)(g). The union is subject to a loss
of its union checkoff rights and a judicial fine for violation of the Taylor
Law. N.Y. JUDICIARY LAW § 751(2)(a) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
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employee disputes. 3 If, during the course of negotiations between
the government and the police or fire unions, the State Public Em-
ployment Relations Board (PERB) determines that an impasse ex-
ists, the Board is required to appoint a mediator. 4 If the mediator
fails to end the controversy within fifteen days, either party may
request the appointment of a fact-finding commission. 5 If the mat-
ter is unresolved after thirty days, the fact-finder makes advisory
recommendations and findings of fact." If this action fails to settle
the dispute, a 1974 amendment to the Taylor Law empowers the
PERB to refer the matter to an arbitration panel which, after
holding public hearings, makes final and binding 18 recommenda-
tions 9 to the parties.
The provisions of the Taylor Law dealing with police and fire
unions refer only to negotiations with unions outside of New York
City. 0 Disputes involving New York City's police and firemen are
13. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209 (McKinney Supp. 1974).
14. Id. § 209(4)(a).
15. Id. § 209(4)(b).
16. Id.
17. Id. § 209(4)(c)(i).18. Id. § 209(4)(c)(vi).
19. Id. § 209(4)(c)(iv). The provisions of the New York Civil Service
Law mandating binding arbitration when an impasse is reached were re-
cently ruled unconstitutional on the grounds that they permitted the arbi-
tration board to make legislative decisions dealing with expenditures of tax
money. City of Amsterdam v. Helsby, 79 Misc. 2d 676, 362 N.Y.S.2d 698
(Sup. Ct. 1974). The arbitration panel is composed of one member selected
by the city, one selected by the union, and one member approved by both.
The court noted that this provision gave the 25,000 citizens of Amsterdam
the same representation on the panel as the 90-100 police and firemen
represented by the union. Id. at 683, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 705. The court then
found the provisions unconstitutional as a violation of the one-man, one-
vote principle. Id. at 685, 362 N.Y.S.2d at 707-09. The court noted that
cities are free to submit voluntarily to compulsory arbitration, as New
York City has done, see text accompanying notes 20-27 infra, but they
cannot be compelled by the state to accept it. 79 Misc. 2d. at 696, 362
N.Y.S.2d at 718.
20. N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 209(4) (McKinney Supp. 1974). Therefore,
the foregoing arbitration provisions apply only with respect to police and
firemen outside of New York City. The provisions dealing with public
employees other than police and firemen provide for a PERB-appointed
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covered by the New York City Collective Bargaining Law,"' the
city's implementation of the state's Taylor Law. This law permits
the city's Office of Collective Bargaining (OCB) to appoint a media-
tion panel.2 If mediation is unsuccessful and the Director of the
OCB determines that all collective bargaining procedures have been
exhausted, he may appoint an impasse panel.3 That panel holds
hearings, takes whatever action it deems necessary to break the
impasse, 4 and issues a report which is submitted to the parties.25 A
dissatisfied party may appeal the decision to the OCB,26 which then
makes a final determination that is binding upon the parties. 7
These provisions, in effect at the time of the firemen's strike, were
unable to prevent the walkout. 8
Other states have developed a variety of methods to deal with
public employee disputes. In 1970, Hawaii and Pennsylvania be-
came the first states to permit public employee strikes, though on
mediator, id. § 209(3)(a), and fact-finding board, id. § 209(3)(b). If the
dispute is not resolved eighty days before the end of the fiscal year of the
governmental unit, the fact-finding board makes recommendations to the
chief executive officer of the governmental unit involved, and to the em-
ployee organization, and also makes its recommendations public shortly
thereafter. Id. § 209(3)(c). If the impasse continues after this, the PERB
shall have the power to "take whatever steps it deems appropriate to
resolve the dispute," including making recommendations and assisting in
setting up voluntary arbitration. Id. § 209(3)(d). If the union and the
public employer do not accept the recommendations of the fact-finding
board, the chief executive officer of the government involved shall submit
his recommendations to the legislative body, which conducts a public hear-
-ing and thereafter takes "such action as it deems to be in the public
interest, including the interest of the public employees involved." Id. §
209(3)(e).
21. NEw YORK, N.Y., ADMIN. CODE ANN. ch. 54, §§ 1173-3.0 to -12.0
(Supp. 1974).
22. Id. § 1173.7-0(b)(2).
23. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(2).
24. Id. § 1173-7.0(c)(3)(a).
25. Id.
26. Id. § 1173-7.0(e)(4)(a).
27. Id. § 1173-7.0(e)(4)(b).
28. These sections of the Collective Bargaining Law, see text accom-
panying notes 19-25 supra, were passed on January 12, 1972, and were to
take effect immediately. City of New York Local Law No. 1, LOCAL LAWS
OF CITIES, COUNTIES, TOWNS AND VILLAGES, N.Y., 144 (1972).
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a limited basis."9 However, both states recognize the importance of
uninterrupted services of police and firemen, and strikes by these
and other groups essential to the public health, safety, and welfare
are prohibited. 0 Alaska' and Vermont" also permit limited strikes
in the public sector; however, strikes by police or firemen are pro-
hibited.13 Rhode Island has classified public employees into four
categories 34-police, 3 firemen, 3 teachers,37 and others. 8 All are re-
quired to meet and bargain with the public employer 9 and are pro-
29. Haemmel, Government Employees and the Right to Strike-The
Final Necessary Step, 39 TENN. L. REV. 75, 85 (1971). Hawaii permits
strikes after exhaustion of mediation, fact-finding, permissive arbitration,
the passage of sixty days following the recommendations of the fact-finding
commission, and after ten days' notice has been given. Strikes which pose
a danger to the public health and safety are prohibited. HAWAH REV. STAT.
§§ 89-11 to -12 (Supp. 1974). Pennsylvania expressly prohibits strikes by
guards at prisons and mental hospitals, or employees directly concerned
with and necessary to the functioning of the courts. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43,
§ 1101.1001 (Supp. 1974). Strikes by other services are prohibited if they
create a "clear and present danger . . . to the health, safety, or welfare of
the public." Id. § 1101.1003. Separate provisions of the labor law mandate
binding arbitration in tfie case of police and firemen. Id. § 217.1-.7.
30. See note 29 supra.
31. ALASKA STAT. § 23.40.200 (1972).
32. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730 (Supp. 1974).
33. In both of these jurisdictions, strikes by others which are harmful
to the public health, safety, or welfare are also prohibited. ALASKA STAT. §
23.40.200(b) (1972); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1730(3) (Supp. 1974).
34. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9-1 to -9-26 (1968).
35. Id. §§ 28-9.2-1 to -9.2-14.
36. Id. §§ 28-9.1-1 to -9.1-14.
37. Id. §§ 28-9.3-1 to -9.3-16; see text accompanying notes 39-40 infra.
38. R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.4-1 to -9.4-19; see text accompanying
notes 39-40 infra.
39. The negotiation provisions with respect to teachers and municipal
employees are basically the same as for police and firemen and provide for
mediation or arbitration and good faith bargaining by the city and the
employees. See R.I. GEN. LAWS ANN. §§ 28-9.3-9, .4-5, .4-10. These pro-
ceedings are initiated at the request of either party, whereas in the case of
police and firemen, the arbitration provision is mandatory. Id. §§ 28-9.1-7
(firemen), 28-9.2-7 (police).
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hibited against striking." If no solution is reached, disputes are
submitted to binding arbitration.4
All of the above statutes, including New York's Taylor Law, are
civil in nature. The court in Vizzini rejected defendants' arguments
that the Taylor Law provided the exclusive remedies with respect
to a public employee strike,4" and ruled that the Taylor Law will not
protect a union leader from liability43 for conduct which, if engaged
in by another citizen, would be criminal.44
In Vizzini, individuals who precipitated a strike of public employ-
ees were subjected to criminal prosecutions for reckless endanger-
ment under the New York Penal Law.45 Reckless endangerment is
divided into two degrees. The first degree forbids conduct by the
defendant evincing a depraved indifference to human life which
40. Id. §§ 28-9.1-1 (firemen), 28-9.2-2 (police), 28-9.3-1 (teachers), 28-
9.4-1 (other municipal employees).
41. Id. §§ 28-9.2-7 to -9 (police), 28-9.1-7 to -9 (firemen); see note 39
supra.
42. 78 Misc. 2d at 1044, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 148-49.
43. The court reasoned that where the legislature intended to excuse a
union from liability it did so with specific legislative enactments. Id., 359
N.Y.S. 2d at 149.
44. The court here relied on Caso v. District Council 37, 43 App. Div.
2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (2d Dep't 1973). This was a civil action brought
by the Nassau County Executive to recover damages caused by a strike of
New York City sewer treatment plant personnel. The union called its men
out on strike and the plants were left unattended and billions of gallons of
raw untreated sewage was released which eventually wound up on Nassau
beaches. The court upheld the nuisance action of the county and rejected
the claims of the union that the Taylor Law provided the exclusive reme-
dies in labor actions. Interestingly, the court in Caso specifically rejected
the theory of an earlier civil damage action brought by businessmen for
damages as a result of New York City's transit strike, stating: "The as-
sumption in Jamur [Jamur Prods. Corp. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273
N.Y.S.2d 348 (Sup. Ct. 1966)] that the risk of damage in the subway strike
was unforeseeable should be rejected, since it is the very inevitability of
extensive damage which led to the prohibition of public strikes." 43 App.
Div. 2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177.
45. N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 120.20, .25 (McKinney 1967); see text accom-
panying notes 46-49 infra.
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creates a grave risk of death to another person.46 The second degree47
crime requires that the conduct be engaged in recklessly," and that
it create a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another
person. 9 It need not be proved that the acts in question were di-
rected against any specific individual." Either actual knowledge of
the serious risks involved, or knowledge which would inform a rea-
sonable man of such risks, is sufficient to bring the actor's conduct
within the purview of the statute.'
Defendants contended that the reckless endangerment statute
was intended to prohibit and punish specific physical acts such as
46. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.25 (McKinney 1967) provide. "A person is
guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under circum-
stances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly en-
gages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person."
47. Id. § 120.20 provides: "A person is guilty of reckless endanger-
ment in the second degree when he recklessly engages in conduct which
crates a substantial risk of serious physical injury to another person."
48. The Penal Law defines "reckless" in the following manner: "A
person acts recklessly with respect to a result or to a circumstance de-
scribed by a statute defining an offense when he is aware of and consciously
disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that such result will occur
or that such circumstance exists. The risk must be of such nature and
degree that disregard thereof constitutes a gross deviation from the stan-
dard of conduct that a reasonable person would observe in the situation."
Id. § 15.05.
49. See People v. Graham, 41 App. Div. 2d 226, 227, 342 N.Y.S.2d 361,
363 (2d Dep't 1973); People v. Smith, 76 Misc. 2d 867, 352 N.Y.S.2d 92
(J. Ct. 1973).
50. People v. Graham, 41 App. Div. 2d 226, 227, 342 N.Y.S.2d 361, 363
(2d Dep't 1973).
51. People v. Mason, 198 Misc. 452, 456, 97 N.Y.S.2d 462, 466 (County
Ct. 1950). That the actor does not view his conduct as dangerous is of no
consequence, as his lack of realization of the danger may be attributable
to his "abnormally reckless temperament or from unexpectedly favorable
results of previous conduct of the same sort." People v. Eckert, 2 N.Y.2d
126, 131, 138 N.E.2d 794, 797, 157 N.Y.S.2d 551, 556 (1956) (citations
omitted). The requirement of scienter is distinguishable from that re-
quired to establish civil liability in negligence actions, since the latter re-
quires merely that the actor fail to perceive the risk. DOWSEY, CHARGES TO
THE JURY AND REQUESTS TO CHARGE IN A CRIMINAL CASE IN NEW YORK, Pt.
1, Form # 220, at 11-10 (1969).
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shooting a rifle into a crowd or driving recklessly at high speeds.52
The present statute has in fact been applied to such situations.5"
Historically, reckless endangerment was dealt with on an ad hoc
basis within detailed Penal Code provisions for a wide variety of
specific offenses. 4 For example, under the former Penal Law, a per-
son who broke a contract to work, thereby creating a danger to life
or causing bodily injury, or exposing valuable property to destruc-
tion, was guilty of a misdemeanor.5 Common to these specific offen-
52. 78 Misc. 2d at 1048, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 152.
53. See, e.g., People v. Graham, 41 App. Div. 2d 226, 342 N.Y.S.2d 361
(2d Dep't 1973) (defendant put gun to person's chest and pulled the trig-
ger, not realizing that the gun was not loaded, and was convicted of first
degree reckless endangerment); People v. Nixon, 33 App. Div. 2d 403, 309
N.Y.S.2d 236 (3d Dep't 1970) (defendant pointed shotgun at police officer
and refused orders to drop the weapon); People ex rel. Clifford v. Krueger,
59 Misc. 2d 87, 297 N.Y.S.2d 990 (Sup. Ct. 1969) (defendant fired a rifle
shot into his sister's house, no one was injured).
54. There are many examples of the reckless conduct statutes in the
old Penal Law. N.Y. PENAL LAW OF 1909 (McKinney 1967), for example,
dealt with the following: running horses on public highway (id. § 194);
failure to protect the public from attack by wild animals and reptiles (id.
§ 197); dueling (id. §§ 730-37); throwing knives or shooting at a human
being in course of an exhibition (id. § 831); hazing (id. § 1030); negli-
gently furnishing insecure scaffolding (id. § 1276); raising unauthorized
pressure of steam in boiler (id. § 1891); generation of unsafe amount of
steam (id. § 1892); driving vehicles or riding animals on the sidewalk
(id. § 1909); refusal to labor by breaking contract (id. § 1910); placing
recepticals on window sills (id. § 1917); abandonment of containers which
might attract children (id. § 1920); failure to fence off ice-cutting opera-
tions on a lake or river (id. § 1922); failure to cover abandoned wells or
cesspools (id. § 1923).
55. Id. § 1910 provided: "A person, who wilfully and maliciously, either
alone or in combination with others, breaks a contract of service or hiring,
knowing, or having reasonable cause to believe, that the probable conse-
quence of his so doing will be to endanger human life, or to cause grievous
bodily injury, or to expose valuable property to destruction or serious in-
jury, is guilty of a misdemeanor." It appears that the application of the
reckless endangerment statute is limited to the leaders of the union, i.e.,
those who actually call the men out on strike. While injunctive relief is
ordinarily granted against the strikers, the union itself, and/or the union
leaders, see Annot., 37 A.L.R.3d 1147, 1154 (1971), liability for the crimi-
nal action is apparently limited to those who, by their action, create a sub-
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ses, however, was a legislatve judgment that the prohibited conduct
created a substantial risk of bodily injury to innocent persons-a
risk out of proportion to any possible utility of the conduct.5" The
present statute is not limited to these cases; it 'is designed to
encompass all acts which create substantial risk of injury to another
person."
The essential role of continued fire protection in a city has long
been recognized in the statutory 8 and common law59 histories of
stantial risk of injury. In the case of individual firemen the creation of the
risk by one man's striking would be difficult to prove. The creation of the
risk is far more apparent vis-a-vis the leader who calls 10,000 firemen off
the job.
56. The reckless endangerment sections of the present Penal Law
largely originate from section 211.2 of the American Law Institute's Model
Penal Code, Proposed Official Draft of 1962:. "Recklessly endangering
another person. A person commits a misdemeanor if he recklessly engages
in conduct which places or may place another person in danger of death
or serious bodily injury."
57. N.Y. PENAL LAW, § 120.20, Practice Commentary (McKinney
1967). See also People v. Graham, 41 App. Div. 2d 226, 342 N.Y.S.2d 361
(2d Dep't 1973). The reckless endangerment statute has been challenged
as unconstitutionally vague and indefinite. However, when read in con-
junction with section 15.05 of the Penal Law (defining "reckless"), the
statute has been held to be constitutional. People v. Nixon, 33 App. Div.
2d 403, 406, 309 N.Y.S.2d 236, 239 (3d Dep't 1970); People v. Luchetti, 33
App. Div. 2d 566, 305 N.Y.S.2d 259 (2d Dep't 1969) (mem.). "The stan-
dards laid down by the statute are clear in their meaning and are capable
of reasonable application to varying fact patterns." People v. Nixon, 33
App. Div. 2d 403, 406, 309 N.Y.S.2d 236, 239 (3d Dep't 1970). A statute
meets the court's test of constitutionality "so long as it affords 'some
comprehensible guide, rule or information as to what must be done and
what must be avoided, to the end that the ordinary member of society
may know how to comply with its requirements.'" People v. Klose, 18
N.Y.2d 141, 146, 219 N.E.2d 180, 182, 272 N.Y.S.2d 352, 355 (1966),
quoting People v. Grogan, 260 N.Y. 138, 145, 183 N.E.2d 273, 276 (1932);
People v. Meola, 7 N.Y.2d 391, 394, 165 N.E.2d 851, 853, 198 N.Y.S.2d 276,
279 (1960). See also Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373 (1912); United
States v. Brewer, 139 U.S. 278 (1890). What is forbidden by the reckless
endangerment statute is the creation of a substantial risk of injury.
58. See text accompanying notes 28,40 supra. The old Penal Law in
New York made it a criminal offense to interfere with the lawful efforts of
firemen to extinguish fires. N.Y. PENAL LAW OF 1909, § 1914 (McKinney
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various jurisdictions. The gravity of the situation is apparent in
New York City where there were eighty fires in the five and one-half
hour period of the strike." A protracted strike of firemen in New
York City has the potential for a disastrous loss of lives and prop-
erty."' Labor unions and their leaders are obviously aware of this
1967): "A person who at any burning of a building is guilty of any disobedi-
ence to lawful orders of a public officer or fireman, or of any resistance to,
or interference with, the lawful efforts of a fireman or company of firemen,
to extinguish the same, or of any disorderly conduct likely to prevent the
same from being extinguished, or who forbids, prevents or dissuades others
from assisting to extinguish the same, is guilty of a misdemeanor." See also
id. § 1906(4) which required a person, under penalty of a misdemeanor, to
assist in fighting forest fires. Indeed, the present N.Y. PENAL LAW § 195.15
(McKinney 1967) states: "A person is guilty of obstructing firefighting
operations when he intentionally and unreasonably obstructs the efforts of
any fireman in extinguishing a fire, or prevents or dissuades another from
extinguishing or helping to extinguish a fire." Originally a class B misde-
meanor, the offense was raised to class A misdemeanor after certain riotous
incidents in New York City during which persons interfered with firemen
attempting to extinguish fires. It is not quite clear why the defendants in
the instant case were not charged with this offense. As the Practice Com-
mentaries to the section point out, it was intended to cover conduct
that was "not necessarily 'by means of intimidation, physical force, or
interference, or, by means of any independently unlawful act', as is
required by section 195.05." It is possible, however that the statute was
designed to cover acts at the scene of specific fires, and thus would pre-
clude action against Vizzini and his co-defendants. There have been no
cases prosecuted under this statute, however, and it is extremely difficult
to predict the precise use to be made of it.
59. See Fletcher v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 6 Ill. App. 3d 593, 286 N.E.2d
130 (1972); Rockford v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, 98 Ill: App. 2d
36, 240 N.E.2d 705 (1968); Garavalia v. Stillwater, 283 Minn. 335, 168
N.W.2d 336 (1969); Grandview v. Moore, 481 S.W.2d 555 (Mo. App. 1972);
City of Dover v. International Ass'n of Firefighters, Local 1312, - N.H.
__, 322 A.2d 918 (1974).
60. Altogether there were eighty fires during the five and one-half hour
period of the strike, but headquarters personnel, probationary firemen and
non-strikers went to the scene of 338 alarms, 187 of which were classified
as "mischievous." N.Y. Times, Nov. 6, 1973, at 31, col. 1.
61. The damage in New York City was kept to a minimum during the
strike by citizen volunteers, police, and probationary firemen who assisted
the skeleton force of non-striking firemen. Fire Commissioner O'Hagan
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potential.2
An interesting situation is presented if an offical of a public em-
ployee union threatens to call a strike, but in fact does not. Such
conduct by the leaders of fire and other essential service unions may
constitute criminal coercion."
The New York Penal Law imposes criminal liability for coercion
where one person compels another to act or refrain from acting by
instilling in him a fear that if a demand is not complied with the
actor will (among various other things) "engage in . . . cohduct
constituting a crime."64
The statute also imposes criminal liability for threatening to
'cause a strike . . . injurious to some person's business . '.'..5
Labor leaders are exempt from this specific provision, but where the
blamed false alarms on the strikers and criticized picketing firemen who
blocked fire engines. In the Bronx, it was estimated that fewer than 10%
of the sixty fire companies in the borough were prepared for some sort of
fire-fighting. Commissioner O'Hagan estimated that "no borough in the
city was even as much as 50% operational." N.Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1973, at
30-31. During the strike period, 2,200 firemen are normally on duty, yet
only 138 UFA members actually reported for work. In addition, 275 officers
of the Fire Department were prepared to perform duties normally assigned
to UFA members.
62. See note 3 supra.
63. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60(6)(McKinney 1967). The coercion section
of the Penal Law provides that if one attempts to induce action by the
threat of criminal activity, he is criminally liable. The action need not be
that of the defendant, and may also be a threat of action by someone
else. DOWSEY, supra note 51, at 8-32. Coercion consists of intimidating a
person to do or refrain from doing something by instilling in him a fear
that, on non-compliance with the demand, one of the several prohibited
consequences will occur. Id. at 8-31. The threats may be either express
or implied. Id. If the threat is of conduct that is criminal and the threat
induces the action or non-action by the victim, the conduct is regarded as
coercive. The law does not define the proscribed conduct in detail,
and the area is broad enough to cover any type of illegal activity, excluding
threats of physical injury and property damage, as these two areas are
covered in another section of the statute. Id. at 8-34. See also N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 135.60(1)-(2) (McKinney 1967).
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60(3) (McKinney 1967).
65. Id. § 135.60(6).
1975]
FORDHAM URBAN LAW JOURNAL
threatened strike is for the benefit of union members, the section
does not exempt threats by union leaders to engage in criminal
conduct.
The Vizzini decision establishes that public union leaders may be
held criminally liable when their conduct falls within the ambit of
a criminal statute." Thus, if a public union leader calls a strike
which creates a substantial risk of serious injury to other persons,
he is guilty of reckless endangerment; 7 if he threatens to call such
a strike, he may be guilty of coercion."
The decision in Vizzini subjects all leaders of essential public
service unions to criminal liability if their actions place the public
in "immediate peril."6 The reckless endangerment and coercion
charges lodged against the UFA leaders could apply with equal force
to police unions-and possibly hospital workers and sanitation
workers-if the union's action in striking would place the citizens
of New York in immediate peril. 0 Nevertheless, it is doubtful that
such laws will prevent strikes by public employee unions. The in-
junctive remedies and penalties set out in the Taylor Law have not
deterred such strikes, nor have the various contempt judgments and
fines levied against unions had a noticeable effect.7' Indeed, public
employees are prepared to strike in spite of legislative prohibitions.
If a union feels it is being cheated or that the employer is not negoti-
ating in good faith, or that there is no other way to achieve its
66. 78 Misc. 2d at 1044, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 149.
67. Id. at 1047, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 151.
68. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 135.60(6) (McKinney 1967)
69. 78 Misc. 2d at 1046, 359 N.Y.S.2d at 150.
70. Id.
71. Indeed, in the instant case, the UFA was fined $650,000 for con-
tempt of court's orders. In summation, Justice Fine stated: "The strike
was called after the court on November 5, 1973 had conferred with the
parties and had suggested a method of settling the matter which would
have avoided the strike. Due to the intransigence of the Union and its
officers the settlement was not effectuated. However, on the next day
while the strike was in progress, a settlement on practically the same
terms was accepted by them and the strike was called off." 171 N.Y.L.J.
2, col. 3, (Sup. Ct. Jan. 30, 1974).
72. Lev, Strikes by Government Employees: Problems and Solutions,
57 A.B.A.J. 771 (1971).
[Vol. III
1975] CASE NOTES 761
objectives, there is apparently very little the employer or the state
can do to prevent a strike.
James Clark Quinn

